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THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF AFGHAN WOMEN: THE
INTERACTION BETWEEN ISLAMIC LAW AND MUSLIM
CULTURE t
KATHRYN J. WEBBER *
At the military hospital in the heart of the capital, Afghanistan's
top surgeon [a general in the Afghan army] wrapped herself in a
large shawl and hid in a back room to have a cigarette with four
colleagues.
WAhen the door opened, she jumped, quickly put out the cigarette
and buried herself further inside the shawl, afraid the intruder
was one of the Islamic Taliban soldiers who overran the capital
only days earlier.
But it was a reporter. After confirming the new Taliban rulers
had granted permission for her to be interviewed, the doctor
arranged to meet the reporter the next morning. She smiled,
shook hands and said goodbye.
But the next day, seven unsmiling Taliban fighters, rifles slung
over their shoulders, blocked the door to her office.
"She's gone," said one. They didn't know where, but they knew
she had been replaced - by a man.1
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1. INTRODUCTION
On September 27, 1996, the Taliban, a militant Islamic group,
seized control of Afghanistan's capital. 2 Comprised of Islamic
clerics and students, 3 the Taliban established a new fundamentalist
Islamic government over two-thirds of Afghanistan.4 Initially, the
Afghan population welcomed the Taliban regime, hoping the new,
government would bring peace5 to this war-torn area.6 The
fundamentalist regime, however, would soon bring drastic change
to the Afghan society and economy.7 This Comment examines the
2 See John F. Burns, Kabul's Islamic Rulers Face Rivals' Guns and Growing
Popular Discontent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,1996, at A14.
3 The Taliban name means "religious students" in Arabic. See John F. Burns,
Afghan Professionals Fleeing Rule by Clerics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996, at A8. In
addition, the Taliban have roots in Muslim religious schools established for
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. See Islamic Rebels Pursue Retreating Afghan Army,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1996, at A14. Mullah Muhammad Omar, leader of the
Taliban, is an Islamic cleric who sees himself as the "king of all Muslims." Jon
Swain, Kabul Hushed by Taliban Dark Age, SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 6,1996, at 17.
4 See John F. Burns, In A Stalemate, Afghan Foes Reload, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
1997, at 16. A coalition, known as the Northern Alliance, see John F. Bums, As
Foes Splinter, Afghan Islamic Victors Press On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, at 3,
controls the northern third of Afghanistan. See Plane Crash Kills Foes of Afghan
Rulers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at A5. The Taliban and Northern Alliance
continue to fight. See Burns, supra. In May 1997, the Taliban advanced all the way
to Mazar-i-Sharif, the principal stronghold of the Northern Alliance, but the
Alliance pushed the Taliban back to their initial position when they first took over
Kabul. See id.
5 See, e.g., Islamic Rebels Pursue Retreating Afghan Army, supra note 3, at A14
("Some residents welcomed the Taliban, hoping for an end to factional fighting.");
Anthony Loyd, Taleban's Rough Justice Wins Approval from Crime-plagued Kabul
Citizens, TIMES (London), Nov. 13,1996, at 14 (noting that citizens "welcomed [the]
Taleban's stand on law and the new security it offers for their lives").
6 Afghanistan has a long history of conflict, first by rebels trying to depose
communist rule and then among the various tribal factions trying to gain control
of the country. See John-Thor Dahlburg, Cold War Incursion Sowed Seeds of Terror,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at Al. In 1978, after a left-wing revolution against the
Daoud republic, a pro-Soviet Marxist regime was installed. See id. at A17. In
1979, the new ruler, Hafizullah Amin, imposed "rigorous and unpopular
Communist policies, resulting in an ... uprising that [led] to a massive military
intervention by the Soviet Union. . . ." Id. This civil war lasted until 1989, with
the United States supporting the resistance and the Soviet Union supporting the
Communist government. See id. In 1989, Soviet troops withdrew, and fighting
continued between the old Communist government and the resistance. See id. In
1992, the old Communist regime stepped down. See id. Four years of factional
warfare among the various Afghan tribes followed, and the fighting continues
between the Taliban and the alliance of the northern provinces.
7 See CBS Evening News: Taliban Rulers Impose Strict Islamic Law on Women
(CBS television broadcast, Oct. 10, 1996); Morning Edition: Rebel Islamic Group
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Taliban's economic effects on women.
Women particularly face a darker side of Taliban rule. For
example, one of the Taliban's first actions was to ban women from
all employment.8 Moreover, two women were beaten in the street
for not wearing proper Islamic dress.9 Understanding the full
effect of Taliban's rule on women, however, requires a deeper
analysis than a mere listing of current abuses. It requires an
examination of Islamic law.
The Taliban government has promised that the laws of Islam
will be the laws of the state.10 Islamic law, or Shari'a, affects
Captures Capital of Afghanistan (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 30, 1996) [hereinafter
Morning Edition: Islamic Group. Upon gaining control of the capital, the Taliban
hung the former leader in public. See Islamic Rebels Pursue Retreating Afghan Army,
supra note 3, at 14 (noting that the Soviet Era leader was left "hanging by wire
nooses outside the presidential palace"). The Taliban also forbade men from trim-
ming their beards for 45 days; banned canaries because they sing, outlawed card
games and chess because they encourage gambling; banned soccer as un-Islamic;
and beat a married couple who were riding too closely together on their bicycles.
See Christopher Thomas, Divine Rulers Free Canaries and Ban Chess, TIMES
(London), Oct. 8, 1996, at 11. The Taliban closed movie theaters, burned films, cut
music cassettes, destroyed bottles of liquor, and forced all men to pray in the
mosques. See 60 Minutes: Profile: Taliban (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 3, 1996)
[hereinafter 60 Minutes: Taliban].
8 See John F. Burns, New Afghan Rulers Impose Harsh Mores of the Islamic Code,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at Al, Christopher Thomas, Militants Bring A Veil Down
On Battered Kabul, TIMES (London), Sept. 30, 1996, at 11. The Taliban have not
hesitated to enforce the full extent of their laws. See, e.g., Swain, supra note 3, at 17
(noting that a "widow was prevented.., from burying her dead husband because
[women were] forbidden to work").
9 See Thomas, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that women were beaten for wearing
"un-Islamic" dress).
10 The Deputy Foreign Minister of the government, Sher Mohammed
Stanakzai, has stated, "Afghanistan is an Islamic state, and our rules and
regulations will be... Islamic rules .... [W]hatever is in Islam... will be
implemented [by the Taliban]. We will be strict with that." 60 Minutes: Taliban,
supra note 7. Mullah Mohammed Hassan, one of the most powerful clerics in the
Taliban, has stated, "'We take our lead from our Holy Prophet... and whatever it
[Islam] prohibits, we prohibit.'" See John F. Bums, With Sugared Tea and Caustic
Rules, An Afghan Leader Explains Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1996, at 9. The
Afghan new agency in Pakistan "declared that Afghanistan was" now a 'com-
pletely Islamic state' where a 'complete Islamic system will be enforced.'"
Christopher Thomas, Swift Revenge as Taleban Seizes Control of Kabul, TIMES
(London), Sept. 28, 1996, at 11. See also Afghanistan's Agony, TIMES (London), Oct.
1, 1996, at 17 (noting that the Taliban have imposed Sharia law); John F. Burns,
New Afghan Rulers Shock Even Their Backers in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996,
at A3 (noting that the Taliban is imposing the Islamic laws); Jon Swain, Terror
Chief Found Behind Taliban Lines, TIMES (London), Oct. 27, 1996, at 19 ("The
[Taliban] movement swept through the country imposing harsh sharia law....").
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women in unique ways. The Shari'a has detailed rules concerning
women's inheritance rights, dower rights, and marriage duties.
These rules have specific economic consequences for Afghan
women. Therefore, to understand the economic effects of the
Taliban government on women, one must understand the
economic effects of Islamic law.
This analysis does not, however, automatically conclude that
Islam is anti- woman." Some of the technical Islamic laws,
particularly the laws based on the Quran itself, actually grant
women specific rights to economic resources. At the same time,
the laws of marriage, based more on jurisprudential tradition than
on the Quran itself, can limit women's ability to earn income
through employment.
The real culprits in the economic oppression of women,
however, are social norms and customs. 12 More than the technical
Islamic law itself, these social realities limit Afghan women's
economic opportunities. 3 Studies of women in the Muslim
communities of Egypt, Israel, and the West Bank reveal that the
patriarchal norms of society are the strongest forces that limit
women's access to wealth. Thus, to understand the economic
future of Afghan women, one must understand the interaction of
social norms and Islamic law. This understanding supports the
claim of many Islamic feminists that a rejection of the oppression of
women does not necessarily involve a rejection of Islam. 4
" See Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of
Women, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 311, 312 (1995) ("Islam has often been named as the main
factor inhibiting the development of women's rights in Muslim countries.").
12 See id. (noting that commentators often mistakenly blame Islam itself, and
not the "misinterpretation of Shfi'ah law perpetuated by patriarchal societies," as
the real cause of women's oppression) (footnote omitted).
13 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, in her study of Islamic human rights theories, also
makes this distinction between the Islamic law itself and its interpretation. See
ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS xii (2d ed. 1995). She argues
that in order to understand Islamic views of human rights, one must look at the
extrapolation of rules and policies from Islamic law and not "the core doctrines of
Islam." Id.
14 See Morning Edition: Muslim Women Gather to Discuss Responses to Militants
(NPR radio broadcast, May 13, 1996) (noting that Buthena Sihbahn, a professor in
Syria, feels that the problem of fundamentalism is its misinterpretation of the
basic tenets of Islam); see also Weekend Edition: Muslim Feminist Comments on
Women in Islam (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 20, 1994) (noting that Dr. Mahnaz
Afkhami, executive director of the Sisterhood is Global Institute, stated that the
essence of Islam is egalitarian, whereas anti-feminism comes from society). See
generally GERALDINE BROOKS, NINE PARTS OF DESIRE (1995) (arguing that Islam
essentially carries a liberating message for women, but that cultural practices have
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This Comment argues that social norms, more so than the
technical Islamic law, limit Afghan women's access to economic
resources. Subsequently, this Comment predicts the economic
future of Afghan women by analyzing both Islamic law and
Muslim society. First, Sections 1.1 and 1.2 present the relevance of
Afghanistan's experience to other international issues. Having
established the Taliban's importance in the international realm,
Sections 2 and 3 examine the internal forces in Afghanistan that
affect women economically.
Section 2 analyzes the Islamic laws on inheritance, dower, and
marriage. Section 2 determines that Islamic law grants women
rights to certain types of wealth. Section 3 then examines the social
norms that limit the economic rights to inheritance, dower, and
marriage found in Islamic law. An analysis of studies from other
Islamic communities shows how social forces shape the reality of
Muslim women's legal rights and predicts the economic future of
Afghanistan. Thus, Section 3 contends that social norms acting
upon inheritance, dower, and marriage, and not the definition of
these legal rights, limit Afghan women's access to economic
resources. Section 4 then suggests a methodology for improving
the economic status of Afghan women. This Section shows that
any reform must come from a new interpretation of Islamic law,
rather than a total rejection of Islamic jurisprudence.
1.1. Afghanistan's Stability Is an Important International Issue
The effect of Islamic rule on Afghanistan is especially relevant
to current international issues. First, the unstable situation in
Afghanistan is of immediate significance to the international
community. The Taliban continue to fight against an alliance of
the more moderate northern provinces.'5 India, Iran, and Russia
support the northern government, 16 whereas Pakistan supports the
Taliban.17 The United Nations ("UN") has expressed concern over
distorted this message).
15 See supra note 4; see also John F. Burns, As Foes Splinter, Afghan Islamic
Victors Press On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, at 3 (noting that the Northern Alliance
gives women far more freedom than the Taliban).
16 See John F. Burns, Afghan Fights Islamic Tide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996, at
Al.
17 See John F. Burns & Steve LeVine, How Afghans' Stern Rulers Took Hold, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1996, at Al; David Rieff, In Afghanistan, a Dangerous Peace, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1997, at 23.
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the continued fighting and human rights abuses in the country.' 8
On December 17, 1996, the UN passed a resolution calling for all
Afghan parties to meet with UN representatives in an attempt to
restore peace.' 9 In addition to the problems caused by the
continual war, Afghanistan's condition raises issues of
international aid,20 the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, 21 the
18 See UN General Assembly Concerned Over Human Rights Abuses, (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 20, 1996).
19 See id. The United Nations also faces the controversy over the Taliban's
request to be given Afghanistan's seat in the General Assembly.
20 Afghanistan is very weak economically and the civil war between Islamic
rebels and the Soviets led to further economic and civil destruction. Afghanistan
is one of the poorest nations in the world. See Dahlburg, supra note 6. Most of its
roads were damaged during the civil war and it has almost no railways. See id. It
has one of the lowest life expectancies and the highest infant mortality rates in the
world. See id.
Afghanistan will continue to need international aid, but the Taliban's policies
on women interfere with the willingness and ability of aid organizations to bring
economic support to Afghanistan. The United Nations suspended its aid
programs on November 21, 1996 because the safety of the aid workers could not
be guaranteed. See Workers Freed, U.N. Resumes Afghan Aid, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12,
1996, at A8 (noting that the U.N. resumed aid when the Taliban released four aid
workers who had been arrested). Two French aid workers were arrested for
sitting with Afghan women at a luncheon. See Afghans to Prosecute French Aid
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb., 27, 1996 at A16. Some aid programs have been
suspended because female aid workers have been forced to stay home. See John F.
Bums, Afghan Professionals Fleeing Rule by Clerics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996, at A8;
see also Women and Islam, TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 1996, at 19 (noting that women
are forbidden to work); infra note 24 (noting the particular problems continuing
international aid in the face of the Taliban's harsh policies on women).
The Taliban has indicated that withdrawing international aid will not affect
their policies. See Bums, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that according to one of the
Taliban's leaders, the Taliban council has agreed to limit its use of Western aid to
avoid giving other countries financial leverage over Taliban policies).
21 Understanding the Taliban in Afghanistan helps in understanding the
implications of the continual spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The spread of
Islamic fundamentalism and its consequences are pressing current issues. "Islam
has also re-emerged in Muslim politics. Islam is used by governments to
legitimate their rule and policies, and it also serves as an umbrella for opposition
forces who seek to topple 'un-Islamic governments."' JOHN L. Esposrro, WOMEN
IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW ix (1982); see also Urfan Kahliq, Beyond the Veil?: An
Analysis of the Provisions of the Women's Convention and the Law as Stipulated in
Shari'ah, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1995) (noting that Islam is experiencing a
resurgence in many countries). Even the traditionally secular Turkey has faced a
resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism. See Morning Edition: Kemalists Try to
Counter Rise in Islamic Fundamentalism (NPR radio broadcast, July 22,1996).
The intifada in Gaza and the West Bank and the unrest in Kasmir, see Federal
News Service, Joint Press Conference with President Bill Clinton and Pakistani
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Apr. 11, 1995, have revealed how Islam can be a
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supply of heroin world-wide, 22 and international terrorism.23
1.2. The Economic Situation of Afghan Women Is Relevant to
International Human Rights Efforts
Islam's effect on Afghan women presents an important
international issue.24 In response to the Taliban's repressive
significant force in political movements.
Thus, "[flear of the Taliban's fundamentalism has reached beyond
Afghanistan's borders." Burns, supra note 3, at A8; see also Rieff, supra note 17, at 23
(noting that an Islamic government in Afghanistan would facilitate the further
spread of fundamentalism in Uzbekistan).
22 Afghanistan is currently the supplier of almost half of the world's heroin.
See Michael Dynes, Holy Army Bolsters Heroin Trade, TIMES (London), Oct. 2, 1996,
at 9. Despite the Taliban's opposition to heroin use by Afghans, it profits from
taxing drugs sent abroad. See John F. Bums, Afghanistan Reels Back Into View, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1996, at 5; see also Dynes supra (noting that the Taliban levy a 10% tax
on the heroin crop).
23 Many Muslim fundamentalists who fought in the Afghan wars have
transformed their ideological and military experience into terrorist action. See
Congressional Testimony Document Clearing House, D. Khalid Duran testifying
on the Situation in Afghanistan, Apr. 16, 1996. "Transnational groups comprised
of fanatical Islamic extremists... who fought in Afghanistan... now drift to
other countries with the aim of establishing anti-western, fundamentalist regimes
by destabilizing traditional governments and attacking U.S. and Western targets."
Dahlburg, supra note 6, at A16. For example, the terrorists who bombed the
United States Military base in Saudi Arabia had fought in the Afghan war. See id.
The State Department reports that almost all Afghan factions are still involved in
training terrorists. See id. Saudi Islamic militant Osama Bin Laden, a suspected
organizer and financier of terrorist acts (specifically the Saudi Arabia bombing),
lives in Afghanistan and is "an honoured guest in Kabul." Swain, supra note 10, at
19.
These implications for international terrorism do not end with the establishment
of one rule over a major part of the country. Afghanistan does more than offer a
military context in which terrorists can be trained. It gives the ideological under-
pinnings for an aggressive jihad, and is spreading jihad enthusiasm to other
countries. See Dahlburg, supra note 6.
The Taliban's clerics support the notion of jihad that entails overthrowing non-
Muslim states through force. See id. For example, one Taliban member stated,
"'When we have conquered Afghanistan, we will conquer the whole world for
Islam.'" Tim McGirk, Taliban Zealots Determined to Enforce A Strict Vision of Islam,
VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 28,1996, at A10 (quoting a member of the Taliban).'
24 The economic impact of Islamic rule upon women is a current issue in
many other countries.
Because of the resurgence of Islamic movements, the position of women
living under Islamic laws has become of increasing importance in recent
years.... [T]his "re-awakening" of religious identity has led to a surge
in the "Islamisation" of domestic laws in countries such as Iran, Egypt,
Sudan, Malaysia and Pakistan, and a corresponding decline in the
fortunes of women living under these regimes.
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actions, an international group of Muslim women has published a
manual on the rights of women under Islam.25 The Taliban has
admitted that the "treatment of women in Afghanistan is a
stumbling block to better relations... [with] the West."26 In
addition, the experience of women in Afghanistan is relevant to the
ongoing debate over the compatibility of Islam and international
human rights agreements. 27 The recent United Nations Conference
on Women has highlighted the problem of applying International
Women's Rights conventions to the particular situation of Islamic
women.28 Thus, an examination of the economic effects of the
Taliban rule on women ,offers relevant information for
understanding both the impact of Islamic fundamentalism and the
problems fundamentalism causes for international women's issues.
2. THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LAW ON AFGHAN WOMEN:
INHERITANCE, DOWER, AND MARRIAGE
The economic effect of Taliban rule initially seems obvious.
Before the Taliban came to power, women were a significant part
Khaliq, supra note 21, at 3.
The impact of the Taliban on Afghan women's economic position is also
relevant to international aid programs. First, banning women from work
promises to place more Afghan families into poverty and increases the need for
aid. See, e.g., CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 10, 1996) (noting
the large number of war widows who were the sole family providers until the
Taliban banned women from work); Swain, supra note 3 (noting that tens of
thousands of families who were dependent upon the income of their female
relatives have been put on the breadline). At the same time, a number of agencies
are leaving Afghanistan because of its oppressive policies toward women. See,
e.g., Christopher Thomas, Crackdown on Women's Rights Leaves Aid Agencies Split on
Kabul Pullout, TIMES (London), Oct. 31, 1996, at 15 (noting Oxfam suspended its
operations in Kabul because women were banned from working).
25 See Barbara Crossette, A Manual on Rights of Women Under Islam, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29,1996, at A4.
26 Terence White, Taliban Acknowledge Afghan Women's Issues Stumbling Block
with West, AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 22,1996.
27 See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 13; Hilary Charlesworth et al., Resolving
Conflicting Human Rights Standards in International Law, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROC.
336 (1991); Surya Prakash Sinha, The Axiology of the International Bill of Human
Rights, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 21 (1989); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus
Islamic Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994).
28 See Weekend Edition: Meaning of Documents at Women's Conference in Beijing
(NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 16, 1995); Morning Edition: Women in Beijing Debate
Religion and Freedom of Choice (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 11, 1995); Khaliq, supra
note 21.
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of the workforce. 29 The Taliban's rule banning women from work
denies women access to wages, a crucial means of support.30 The
challenge in understanding the economic reality of Afghan women
is to understand how Islamic law, as distinct from cultural norms,
contributes to their plight.
A common Western response to the economic oppression of
women in Muslim countries is to blame the Islamic religion.31
Islam does have specific laws that affect women economically. 32
An analysis of these laws, rather than a reliance on stereotypes, is
necessary to know whether Islam and its law deserve this blame.
This section examines the Islamic laws on inheritance, dower, and
marriage in order to show that the technical Islamic law is not the
main factor limiting Afghan women's wealth. Rather, some
Islamic laws actually give women specific rights to economic
resources.
2.1. The Legal Impact of the Islamic Religion
An analysis of the economic position of Afghan women
necessarily involves an examination of the tenets of Islam. An
understanding of Islamic law is necessary, not simply because
Islamic clerics formed the Taliban government, but because Islam's
effect on Afghanistan goes beyond shaping the government's
29 "Kabul's women had been allowed to work for 50 years, and without
women the city could not function. The civil service, hospitals and schools
depended on them." Christopher Thomas, Crackdown on Women's Rights Leaves Aid
Agencies Split on Kabul Pullout, TIMES (London), Oct. 31,1996, at 15; see also Bernard
Levin, Taleban Meets Caliban, TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 1996, at 22 (noting that
approximately 250,000 women were working before the Taleban arrived); Jon
Swain, Kabul Hushed by Taliban Dark Age, TIMES (London), Oct. 6, 1996, at 17
(noting that hospitals in Afghanistan are paralyzed because many of the doctors
were women). In Kabul, one woman doctor pleaded with the Taliban members
on the street, asking them to let her work because she had three patients to
operate on. See Swain, supra. "The schools [in Kabul] closed, because all the
teachers were women." Christopher Thomas, Kabul Traffic Cops Under-Employed in
City of Disruption, TIMES (London), Oct. 19,1996, at 16.
30 The Taliban bar on women's employment will further impoverish the
already struggling population of Afghan women. See, e.g., CBS Evening News
(CBS television broadcast, Oct. 10, 1996) (noting the large number of war widows
who were the sole providers for their families until the Taliban banned women
from work); Swain, supra note 29, at 17 (noting that tens of thousands of families
who were dependent upon the income of their female relatives have been put on
the bread line).
31 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11, at 312.
32 See discussion infra Parts 2.1.1-2.1.3, 2.2.
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philosophy. The Islamic religion of the Taliban provides many of
the specific laws of the state? 3 In Islam, religion governs politics,
economics, and law.34  "A striking element in the cultural
configurations that are grounded in Islam is the primary place that
law has within them."35 The Shari'a (Islamic Law) generally, and
the Quran (the Holy Book) specifically, offer detailed rules of a
legal nature.36 These rules are more than theological concepts; they
offer a comprehensive framework for a community, including its
legal provisions.37 Thus, becoming a Muslim state has meant
33 See Khaliq, supra note 21, at 7 (noting that in addition to being the source of
religious norms, Islam is the source of legal principles and rules for Muslims).
Modem Islamic countries have not rejected the Quran and Shari'a as the basic
framework for an Islamic community. For example, both the Iranian and Pakistani
constitutions specifically state that all laws must conform to the dictates of the
Quran. See AYATOLLAH YAHYA NOORI, LEGAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF AN
ISLAMIC STATE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAN AND PAKISTAN 108 (1987) (Appendix 3,
Extracts from the Pakistani Constitution). All evidence shows the new Taliban state
will also use the Quran to structure its laws. See supra note 10.
34 See NOORI, supra note 33, at 68. The structural effects of Islam are very
different from Western concepts of government. For a Muslim state, religion is
not separated from government interference; it is the foundation for the
government itself. See id.
35 Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Law and Islam in the Middle East: An Introduction, in LAW
AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1, 1 (Daisy Hilse Dwyer ed., 1990).
36 ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 3. The Quran has detailed rules for criminal
punishment, marriage and divorce, custody and legitimacy of children,
inheritance, dower, adoption, and slavery. See 'generally IMETIYAZ HUSSAIN,
MUSLIM LAW AND CUSTOMS (1989) (describing in detail the various laws of the
Quran and Shari'a).
37 Dwyer, supra note 35, at 1. The impact of Islam on the structure of a state
can be seen in Pakistan, where religious courts were created as part of the judicial
arm of the government. NOORI, supra note 33, at 106. These courts have the power
to nullify secular laws that do not conform to Islam. Id. at 107.
Thus, Islam clearly has an effect on the entire society. See Audrey Chapman Smock
& Nadia Haggag Youssef, Egypt: From Seclusion to Limited Participation, in WOMEN:
ROLES AND STATUS IN EIGHT COUNTRIES 33, 37 Janet Z. Giele & Audrey C. Smock
eds., 1977) ("Islam, as an integral religion, formulates a total pattern of living rather
than focusing primarily on theology."); ROBERT ROBERTS, THE SOCIAL LAWS OF THE
QORAN 2 (2d ed. 1971) (noting that Muhammed, in addition to founding a religion,
was also a social reformer as well). The impact of Islam on community structure can
be seen in its early history. Islam changed the tribal practices of the early Arabian
communities, often in very significant ways. See ESPosrrO, supra note 21, at 4 (noting
that Islam changed the social customs of Arabian communities). See also AHARON
LAYISH, WOMEN AND ISLAMIC LAW IN A NoN-MuSLIM STATE 279 (1975). For example,
pre-Islamic Arabian tribes denied women all rights to any inheritance. The Quran,
in contrast, gave women specific shares of their relatives' estates. See ESPOSIrrO, supra
note 21, at 5. The Quran also, to some extent, changed marriage from the sale of
women to a contract where women, at least technically, were legal partners. See id.
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implementing the Shari'a and the Quran's specific laws.
All Muslim states with governments similar to the conservative
Taliban rule have instituted the laws of the Quran and Shari'a as
the official law.38 For example, when Pakistan was formed as a
Muslim state it incorporated the Quranic laws of succession,
dower, and polygamy.39 Even non-Muslim states sometimes have
special Islamic courts that apply Quranic laws to its Muslim
citizens.40 Thus, as Sher Mohammed Stanakzai, Deputy Foreign
Minister of the Taliban government, has stated, "Afghanistan is an
Islamic state, and our rules and regulations will be according to
Islamic rules. I mean to say, whatever is in Islam... that will be
implemented. We will be strict with that."41
This implementation of Islamic law is especially relevant for
women because many Quranic and Shari'a laws address women in
particular. 42 These rules do not solely dictate women's theological
or social position; they also significantly affect their economic
position.43 By granting specific inheritance rights,44 dower rights,45
and maintenance rights in marriage, 46 the Quran and Shari'a
dictate the distribution of property within a Muslim community.
Therefore, an analysis of the economic effects of an Islamic rule on
women should begin with the Shari'a.
38 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11.
39 See EsPosITo, supra note 21, at 81-88 (noting the various modem reforms in
Pakistan were necessary because the traditional Quranic laws were in place).
40 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 2 (noting that special Islamic courts in Israel
have exclusive jurisdiction over personal status and waqf (religious endowment)
issues for Muslims).
41 See 60 Minutes, supra note 7.
42 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 37 (noting that Mohammed was
particularly concerned with the position of women); MAYER, supra note 13, at 110
(noting that the Quran devotes considerable attention to the status of women);
Esposrro, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that some of the most important changes
Islam brought to society came from the Quranic passages on women). The Quran
gives specific rules for women in dower, marriage and divorce, inheritance, the
iddat, maintenance, and custody. See generally JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF
WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW (1990) (describing the various Shari'a laws that affect
women).
43 See, e.g., Smock & Youseff, supra note 38, at 37 (noting that Mohammed
gave women property rights).
44 See ANNELIES MOORS, WOMEN, PROPERTY AND ISLAM: PALESTINIAN
EXPERIENCES, 1920-1990, 50-51 (1995).
45 See id. at 43.
46 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 60.
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2.2. Inheritance
Islamic law, also known as the Shari'a, is comprised of four
sources: the Quran (the Holy Book), the Sunna (the model behavior
of the Prophet), qiyas (analogic reasoning), and ijma' (the
consensus of the community).47 This section examines inheritance
an aspects of the Shari'a based on the Quran, the strongest and
most immutable source of law.48
The Quran provides detailed rules governing inheritance.
Certain relatives in an extended family receive a specified share in
a decedent's estate.49 Overall, female relatives get approximately
one-half of what their male counterparts receive.50 For example, if
a couple have children, a husband will inherit one-quarter of his
wife's estate, whereas a wife will only inherit one-eighth of her
husband's estate.5' The father of a decedent will often inherit more
than a wife.5 2 Moreover, a son, as the most favored heir of the
decedent, inherits twice as much as a daughter.5 3
Thus, women generally inherit less than men do under Islamic
law. They do, however, inherit at least a specific amount that a
47 See Dywer, supra note 35, at 2; R.S. SHARMA & NAREHESH KUMAR
MAHESHWARI, KEY TO MUSLIM LAW 1 (1988).
48 See EsPosrro, supra note 21, at 3; Khaliq, supra note 21 at 6.
49 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 50-51.
50 See ROBERTS, supra note 38, at 66; Khaliq, supra note 21, at 14 (noting that
women suffer discrimination in Islamic inheritance law in many ways); Behind the
Chador, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1997, at S9 ("Women, worth less than men under
Islamic law, do not get equal rights to... inheritance."); Muharyani Othman,
Syariah Court Comes Under Fire, NEW STRArrs TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at 6 (noting that
in Malaysia, under Islamic law, men are given a larger share of property inheri-
tance).
51 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 446-447. If the couple had no children the
husband gets a one-half share whereas the wife receives one-quarter. See id.
52 See id. (noting that the father receives a one-sixth share under certain
circumstances).
53 See id. at 450; Can Muslim Women Thrive Under the Veil? Swiss REV. OF
WORLD AFF., Oct. 1, 1996 ("According to Islamic canon, a daughter's share of an
inheritance should be smaller than a son's."); Roula Khalaf, How to be an Iranian
Islamic Feminist, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 21, 1996, at 6 ("[A] daughter receives half
her brother's inheritance.").
The grandmother and grandfather both receive one-sixth shares, but the
paternal grandmother only inherits if there is no father or mother. The paternal
grandfather inherits if there is no father. Both the son's daughter and the full sister
inherit only in the absence of a male counterpart. See HUssAIN, supra note 36, at 446-
47.
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will usually cannot override.54 Thus, the Islamic law of inheritance
affects women economically by guaranteeing female relatives a
certain amount of property through inheritance. The positive
effect of inheritance law on women is that they receive property to
use in the economic system. Compared to men, however, women
are at an economic disadvantage under the inheritance law. Thus,
the Shari'a grants a woman economic resources, but diminishes her
financial position by giving other economic actors, namely men,
more.
2.3. Dower
Dower law probably offers the most positive economic rules for
women under the specific dictates of the Quran. In a study of
Palestinian women living in the West Bank, Annelies Moors
concluded that dower is still the major medium through which
women gain access to property.55 Despite some legal limitations,
the Quran gives women genuine property rights through dower.
56
The Quran dictates that a woman should receive dower as a
free gift upon her marriage. 57 Dower is a gift of either money or
property that a man must give his bride upon the marriage
contract's enactment.58 The purpose of dower is not consideration
for the sale of a wife. Rather, dower may be a "mark of respect for
the wife."5 9 In addition to being a symbol of respect, dower may
also be an important property right for a woman, balancing other
rights given to the husband.60
54 See id. at 26. "[A] man is not free to bequeath his whole estate to
whomever he chooses. He is obligated by law to give certain fixed amounts to
specific heirs. These shares represent the inviolate right of such heirs to an
inheritance." Esposrro, supra note 21, at 45.
The Quran is silent as to the extent of a continued power of testamentary
disposition. See id. However, Islamic clerics have found in the Sunnah (the stories
of the prophet's life) that a person can bequeath up to one-third of his estate to
parties of his own choice as long as they are not his legal heirs. See id. Afghan
Muslims follow the Hanafi sect of Islam. Under Hanafi law, to grant anything
above this allowable one-third, the heirs must give their permission. See id.
55 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 124.
56 See The Limits of Freedom in the Kuwaiti Hothouse, Swiss REV. OF WORLD AFF.,
Jan. 3,1997 (noting that Islam gives women property rights).
57 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 43.
58 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 220.
59 Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11, at 325.
60 See id. at 220.
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A woman is the exclusive owner of her dower.61 She can
dispose of the money or asset as she chooses, without her
husband's permission.62 A woman cannot return the dower to her
husband unless she is sane and gives her free consent.63 In
addition, a marriage cannot be conditional upon the waiver of
dower.64 Most dower is payable to a wife upon demand.65 Unlike
maintenance, discussed later, the dower right is enforceable in
many ways. It is legally enforceable in the courts; or the wife
legally can take possession of her husband's estate until. he pays
her dower.66 In addition, if a man does not pay his wife dower, she
has the right to refuse him sexually 67 and leave, his house without
his permission 6 8-a right of movement rare for the Muslim wife. 69
There are some legal rules that limit the positive economic
effects of dower law for women. If a marriage is not consummated
and the wife is divorced, she receives only half.70 Under Hanafi
law, the Islamic sect the Taliban follow, 7' a wife may refuse sex
with her husband for failure to pay dower, but only if they have
not yet consummated the marriage.72 Thus, to some extent, dower
is still conditional upon sexual submission.
2.4. Marriage
As is true for inheritance and dower, the Shari'a also has
detailed rules for marriage. The Islamic laws on marriage have
many negative social implications for women. Polygamy
specifically is permissible73 and a husband has unilateral power to
divorce his wife. On the other hand, a wife's ability to divorce is
very limited. 74 The main ways, however, in which marriage laws
61 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 47; MOORS, supra note 45, at 86.
62 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 86.
63 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 226.
64 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 44.
65 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 219.
66 See id. at 228.
67 See NASiR, supra note 43, at 57.
68 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 184.
69 See infra Section 2.2.
70 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 52.
71 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 26.
72 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 57.
73 See id. at 24.
74 See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 29-30. See also Seth Mydans, Blame Men, Not
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negatively affect Afghan women's economic positions is through
the doctrines of maintenance and obedience. 75
2.4.1. Maintenance
The basic provision for maintenance seems to offer positive
economic implications for women. The right of maintenance
dictates that a man must provide for his wife at his expense.76 All
Islamic countries have incorporated this religious law as the law of
the state.77  Maintenance is a legal entitlement for a wife,
enforceable in court 78 and available regardless of her independent
wealth.79 Thus, the basic Islamic rule of maintenance seems to
affect women economically by providing a legal right to economic
resources. The other religious laws applicable to maintenance,
however, reveal that the maintenance obligation is severely
limited, difficult to enforce, and easily terminated.
First, maintenance is not a lump sum of money that women
receive and control. Rather, the main requirement of maintenance
is for a husband to provide his wife with food, clothing, lodging,
and medical care.80 Most of maintenance thus does not give a
woman transferable assets that she can use as an economic actor in
the market.
Second, a woman is entitled to maintenance only upon meeting
certain marriage conditions. She is entitled to maintenance only if
a valid marriage contract exists, she "'places... herself in the
Allah, Islamic Feminists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, at A4 (noting that in Islamic
courts "women generally have fewer rights in questions of divorce").
75 The maintenance laws come from a combination of the Quran, Sunnah,
and consensus, see NASIR, supra note 43, at 60, whereas the obedience law does not
stem from a specific Quranic provision, see ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 23.
76 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 59. See also Othman, supra note 51, at 6 (noting
that men have the obligation to financially support family members).
77 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 59 (noting that all modem Arab laws have the
basic marital maintenance provision). In particular, Nasir gives a non-exclusive
list of the maintenance provisions in Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco, and Lebanon. See id.
78 See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 27 ("If the husband refuses to pay mainte-
nance, the wife has the right to sue for it.").
7 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 59-60. Islamic laws do not recognize marriage
as creating communal property; spouses retain ownership of what they owned
before marriage. See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 24.
80 See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 26; NASIR, supra note 43, at 59-60. "If the
husband provides the wife with sufficient food, clothing and other basic needs,
and a decent home, there shall be no point in the wife requiring any maintenance
from the court." Id. at 66.
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husband's power so as to allow him free access to herself
[physically]," and she obeys all his lawful commands.81 The
tamkeen, or the physical availability of a wife, rather than the
marriage contract, is the predicate for maintenance.82 Thus, to gain
access to these economic resources, a woman must physically and
willingly submit to her husband's orders.8 3.
Third, under Hanafi law,84 maintenance is difficult to enforce.
Even if a court finds that a man neglected his maintenance duties,
his wife cannot receive past due maintenance and can only receive
a prospective order of payment.85 Even if a man continuously
refuses to pay maintenance, his wife does not have sufficient
grounds for divorce under Hanafi law.86 Thus, the law may give
no recourse to a woman facing both denial of access to basic
economic provisions of maintenance and restriction in her ability
to work.87 Therefore, maintenance does little to further a woman's
economic position in Afghanistan.
2.4.2. Obedience: Restrictions on Women's Movement
An Afghan woman's duty to obey her husband is the second
aspect of Islamic marriage law that affects her economic position.
According to the Shari'a, a wife has a general duty of obedience to
her husband.88 Islamic jurists, in particular, have found that a
woman cannot leave her husband's home without his permission.8 9
81 NASIR, supra note 43, at 60-61.
82 See id. at 62.
83 If a woman works against her husband's will, he can deny her
maintenance. See id. Thus, a woman sometimes gains the economic resources of
maintenance only at the expense of other economic opportunities.
84 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 26 (noting that Afghans generally follow the
Hanafi sect).
85 See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 27.
86 See id. In most Muslim states it is very difficult for a woman to obtain a
divorce for any reason. See Diego Ribadeneira, Questions on the Koran, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 15,1997, at A12.
87 For example, Farida Ghulam, a member of the Bahrain Young Ladies
Association, noted many cases where the wives were neglected or had no
economic support from their husbands at all. She also noted that the Bahrainian
courts would not force the men to pay, nor allow the women to divorce. See
Women in Bahrain Seek Clear Guidelines on Family Issues as Defined by Sharia Law,
MONEYCLIPS, Sept. 30,1995.
88 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 39; ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 23.
89 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 39; EsPosrro, supra note 21, at 23; LAYISH, supra
note 38, at 101. See also Behind, the Chador, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1997 at S9 (noting
that, under Islamic Law, women do not have the same rights to travel as men). In
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If she leaves without her husband's permission, he can have an
Islamic court declare her rebellious 9° and lawfully withdraw all
economic support.91
Similar to the Quranic laws of inheritance, Islamic countries
generally have not hesitated to enforce the duty of obedience as
state law.92 Syria, Jordan, and Kuwait have even specifically
codified this law of obedience. 93 Whether through codification or
judicial enforcement, the Taliban government is likely to make
obedience part of its general laws.
2.4.3. Employment
The obedience law's limitation on a woman's movement has
significant implications for her ability to seek work outside of
home. Husbands effectively possess the power to prevent their
wives from working. Under the obedience doctrine, if a woman
wants to work and gain access to economic resources, her husband
may turn to the courts for recourse.94 He can stop supporting his
wife95 and even physically punish her with little restriction.96
Saudi Arabia, women are absolutely prohibited from traveling unless
accompanied by a man. See Can Muslim Women Thrive Under the Veil?, supra note
54.
Jan Goodwin, in her book, Price of Honor, describes how the restrictions on
movement affected one wife of an Egyptian taxi driver.
"[The] college educated wife, Wafa [was] confined to their tiny four
room apartment... and forbidden to leave the house for any reason. She
is not even permitted to visit other women living in their apartment
building .... When they were first married, [the husband] insisted that
Wafa discontinue her studies. [The husband said] 'I want to control [my
wife] and my daughter wherever they go .... She has no permission to
go anywhere without me...
JAN GOODWIN, PRICE OF HONOR: MUSLIM WOMEN LIFr THE VEIL OF SILENCE ON THE
ISLAMIC WORLD (1994) 340-42, quoted in Pamela Goldberg, Seeing Through Women's
Eyes, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 603, 611 (1994).
90 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 101 (noting that the judgment of rebelliousness
was one of the traditional powers of an Islamic court); Chand, supra note 91
(noting that Bahrain courts would even encourage husbands to request an order
of obedience).
91 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 101.
92 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 39-40.
93 See id.
94 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 101.
95 See id.
% See id. at 109 ("Wife-beating 'for the purpose of chastisement'... was
considered legitimate from the shari'a point of view .... ").
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Using the obedience doctrine to prevent a woman from
working generally is acceptable in the Muslim world. "The
majority of Islamic jurists [from all Islamic sects] rule that there
shall be no maintenance for the wife who goes out to work without
permission of her husband." 97 Significantly, Muslim countries
have the lowest female employment rates in non-agricultural
jobs.98 The Taliban rule, with its fundamentalist focus, will be no
different. The Taliban did not even wait for husbands to stop
women from working; they banned women from employment
from the beginning.99 Therefore, the Shari'a rules on obedience
will limit an Afghan woman's ability to be a free economic actor.
Overall, although some of the marriage laws will limit
economic wealth, Islamic law itself does not dictate the economic
oppression of Afghan women. Rather, the laws of inheritance and
dower could give Afghan women specific rights to economic
resources. An analysis of the economic situation of Afghan
women, however, cannot stop with Islamic law. Studies of other
Islamic countries have shown that social forces that shape the
impact of inheritance, dower, and marriage law will severely limit
the economic freedom of Afghan women. Thus, the Taliban's
promise to impose Islamic law has an ominous impact on women
because the Taliban also bring an oppressive culture.
3. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS
The gap between legally available options and rights and those
that are actually accessible to most women is very large.100 As
noted previously, Islam contains many legal rules that are meant to
structure Muslim society generally and define gender roles. These
rules will have a clear impact on Afghan women's economic
position. The laws, however, are not the only economic factor. This
Section analyzes three studies of other Muslim communities to
predict the impact of social forces on Afghan women. Moreover,
this Section shows that cultural norms severely limit the technical
rights to inheritance, dower, and marriage maintenance. Thus, by
analyzing the social modification of the three legal rules, this
97 NASiR, supra note 43, at 62. See also Anil Noel Netto, Malaysia- Women:
Discrimination in the Workplace Still Strong, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 3, 1997 (noting
that husbands often are opposed to their wives' desire to work outside the home).
98 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 57.
99 See Morning Edition: Islamic Group, supra note 7.
100 Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 47.
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Section shows how social norms, and not the technical Islamic law,
are the main factors that limit the economic power of Afghan
women. Overall, when the law itself seems to give women access
to property through inheritance and dower, the social reality
nullifies this economic power. In the case of marriage, social forces
enhance the already negative impact of the laws.
Social norms and customs are particularly relevant for a study
of a Muslim society. Custom is a valid, recognized source of
Islamic law.' 01 This section does not, however, focus on the
customary laws separate from the more definitive laws drawn
from the four chief sources: the Quran, Sunnah, the Ijmaa, and the
Qiyas.102 Rather, this Section emphasizes how customs and social
forces affect the three traditional laws discussed previously:
inheritance, dower, and marriage. The information on the impact
of social norms comes mainly from studies of Muslims in Israel,
Egypt, and the West Bank. Clearly, these societies differ from
Afghanistan in many ways. 03 Overall, however, these studies
analyze social factors that are common to Muslim societies. In
particular, these factors stem from the implications of maintenance
laws and from the general patriarchal nature of the societies.
Maintenance is a major part of Muslim law 04 and will be part of
Afghanistan's system. Also, the early actions of the Taliban reveal
a strong patriarchal tendency. 05 Thus, these studies offer relevant
examples sufficiently analogous to predict the future economic
position of Afghan women.
101 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 49; Dwyer, supra note 35, at 2-3 (noting that
customary law is recognized by jurists as a subsidiary, yet valid, source of Muslim
law).
102 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 41, 49. These four elements are the main
sources of Muslim law or Shari'a. See id. at 41. Custom is considered a
supplementary source and if the custom is not expressly forbidden by the Quran,
it can be a source of law. See id. at 49.
103 For example, Egypt is influenced by its history of being controlled by
Great Britain. See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 40-42. Women in the West
Bank are influenced by the intifada. See MOORS, supra note 45, at 121. Women in
Israel have the unique option of turning to the more liberal secular courts. See
LAYISH, supra note 38, at 288-89.
104 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 59 (noting that all modern Arab laws have the
basic marital maintenance provision).
105 The best example of Taliban's patriarchal tendency is its prompt order to
ban women from most employment. See McGirk, supra note 23, at A10.
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3.1. Inheritance
Inheritance is the area of Quranic law that social norms affect
most. All three countries presented in the following examples
reveal that women's actual access to property through inheritance
encounters severe limits under the common social practice of
women giving their inheritance wealth to their patrilineal families.
3.1.1. Egypt
In a study of Egyptian women, Audrey Smock and Nadia
Youssef examined how the kinship group limited women's real
access to inheritance wealth.106 According to Islamic law, a
woman's fathers, uncles, and brothers are economically
responsible for her regardless of her marital status. 07 This kinship
responsibility of support is even stronger than the husband's.1°8
This kinship obligation affects a woman s marital relations; if a
woman is more able to leave her husband if she can rely on her
patrilineal family's obligation to support her. 09 Similarly, this
family maintenance obligation is crucial because of a husband's
almost unlimited right of divorce under Hanafi law."0
Smock and Youssef found, however, that this maintenance
obligation is not a free system of support for women to rely on as
an economic fall-back regardless of their actions. Rather,
patrilineal maintenance was a necessity. A woman had few
options for supporting herself outside of marriage and was
therefore dependent on family maintenance."' To ensure that her
106 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 35.
107 See id. at 43; CNN News: Divine Guidance (CNN television broadcast, Dec.
5, 1995) (noting that a woman's parents, under Islamic law, are directed to
support her financially).
108 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 44.
109 See id. at 46 ("The divorced woman invariably returns to her parents'
home."). Smock and Youssef note that it is the kinship duty of support that
women must rely on upon divorce. See id.
The husband has no duty to maintain a divorced wife after the three-month
iddah. See NASIR, supra note 43, at 96; Esposrro, supra note 21, at 26.
11 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 46 (noting the high frequency of
divorce in Egypt due to the husband's broad right to end a marriage). See also
CNN News: Divine Guidance, supra note 108 (noting that under Islam men can
divorce at will); Khaliq, supra note 21, at 33 ("Islam is renowned for making
divorce amazingly simple for men.").
111 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 47. For example, Smock and
Youssef found that women had few opportunities to earn a living through public
employment due to sex segregation in the workforce and general societal
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patrilineal family will maintain her after divorce or widowhood, a
woman would often try to appease her family. 112 Thus, Smock and
Youssef found that women frequently gave their brothers or
fathers any inherited wealth to ensure that they would maintain
the women after divorce or the death of a husband. 13 The women
did not usually own or have economic control over their inherited
wealth. Thus, social reality restricted the actual property access
that was granted by Quranic inheritance law. This phenomenon of
relinquishing inherited wealth to insure familial maintenance was
also prevalent in the Muslim communities in Israel.
3.1.2. Muslim Communities in Israel
Aharon Layish conducted a study of Muslim women living in
Israel." 4 Layish found that these women, as was the case in Egypt,
gave their inherited wealth to the male members of their patrilineal
family." 5  Layish described the phenomenon as occurring
frequently, particularly considering that many of these transfers of
inherited wealth were not formalized by court order."16
Layish, like Smock and Youssef, also found it was the women's
dependency on family maintenance that spurred this renunciation
of inheritance rights.117 She found that women were at risk of
losing their family maintenance support if they did not relinquish
their inherited wealth to male family members. For example,
disapproval of women working. See id. at 49.
112 See id. at 47.
113 See id. at 47. This study also found the males in a woman's family often
just appropriated her property without sanction on the grounds that they would
have to support their sisters or daughters in the event of divorce. See id.
114 See LAYiSH, supra note 38. Although the state's regular judiciary governs
the Muslim community living in Israel, separate Islamic courts that apply the
Shari'a govern issues of personal status. See id. at 2. "[T]he Muslim religious
community enjoyed the widest judicial autonomy of any religious community in
the country." Id. For issues of inheritance Muslim women could choose to have
their cases decided by a secular court under the more favorable secular laws, but
the majority chose the Shaii'a courts. See id. at 287-88.
This study focused on women living in Israel proper and not the disputed West
Bank areas that the Moors study focused on. See id. at xiii; MOORS, supra note 45, at
19.
113 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 291.
116 See id.
117 "Muslim women did not as a rule inherit... due... to the system of
kinship relations in traditional society, which is so vital to the protection and
security of women that they are willing to renounce property rights for its sake."
Id. at 302.
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There was a definite correlation between the extent of the
son's readiness to pay maintenance to their mothers and the
state of property relations after the death of the family
head: where the mother held the family property of her
share in the estate, the sons were less ready to grant her
economic assistance.118
Layish also found many cases in which although a court
registered a woman's inheritance to her, her brothers eventually
received the wealth through sales without consideration." 9
Familial pressure was often the driving force behind these
transfers.120 Thus, the Muslim women in Israel are another
example of how women's economic rights under the Quran are
limited by social forces. This was also true for the Palestinian
women living in the occupied West Bank territory.
3.1.3. Palestinian Women in the West Bank
In 1995, Annelies Moors published a study of Palestinian
women living in the Jabal Nablus region of the West Bank.121 This
study adds further detail on how family maintenance limits
women's access to inheritance. Like Smock and Youssef, as well as
Layish, Moors found that Muslim women let their patrilineal
family take ownership of their inheritance share to ensure that the
family would maintain them financially.122 Moors also found that
most women depended on this familial maintenance. 123
118 Id. at 105.
119 See id. at 301.
120 See id. at 302. Layish was told of several cases where the woman had her
ownership of inherited property formalized by a court, but later transferred it to
her male family without consideration because "they were no longer able to
withstand family sanctions." Id.
121 See MOORS, supra note 45. This study differs from Layish's study, which
focused on Muslim women living in the undisputed areas of Israel proper. See id.
at 19; LAYISH, supra note 38, at xiii. The two' areas obviously have different
political and economic realities. See MOORS, supra note 45, at 17-21. The Shari'a
court system and Islamic personal status law, however, still govern Muslims in
the occupied territory. See id. at 19. Thus, this study offers another example, with
a different population, of the real effects of the Shari'a.
122 "[Flew daughters with brothers would ever take their [inheritance]
share...." MooRS, supra note 45, at 53. "[Bly leaving her share to her brothers, a
daughter reaffirms and strengthens her ties with her closest male kinsmen." Id. at
54.
123 See id. at 54.
[Vol. 24:4980
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss4/4
AFGHAN WOMEN
Moors' study revealed what would happen to these women if
they did claim their inheritance share. "[I]f a woman demands her
share, ... her kinship ties with her brothers are usually disrupted
at once and she is no longer able to invoke their help and
support." 24 Taking her inheritance, and thus weakening her
familial ties, also weakened a woman's position against her
husband.125 Moors found that the inheritance a woman might gain
did not generally offset the economic loss of lost familial
maintenance.126
Moors also found that even if a woman did not have brothers
(the relatives most likely to get her inheritance share), she still
often did not get her inherited wealth.127 Those with control of her
share often ignored her claim and her actual ability to receive it
depended on the position of her husband. 128 If her patrilineal
family could not stop the woman from taking her share, they
would often, as her guardian 29 (and if she were single), marry her
to a cousin to keep the land in the family. 30 Thus, overall, the
Palestinian women of the West Bank are another example of how
the need for familial maintenance led to women renouncing their
inheritance rights. All three example communities showed that
although the technical law of the Quran allows women to inherit
wealth, social factors limit these rights.
3.2. Dower
As was the case with inheritance, social forces limit a woman's
actual access to property granted to her under Quranic dower law.
In particular, the common Muslim practice of a male guardian
124 Id. at 55.
125 See id.
126 See id. (noting that because of gender-specific agricultural tasks, women
property owners needed men to make their land productive). Women who lost
their male family members' support could not get their brothers to work for them
and therefore lacked sufficient labor to put the land to use. See id.
127 See id. at 58.
128 See id.
129 Guardianship is the rule, recognized by most Islamic jurists, which states
a "woman shall not conduct her own marriage contract... even when she
possesses full legal capacity ... ." NASiR, supra note 43, at 9. Guardianship is
traditionally practiced in Afghanistan. See Angela Neustatter, Homelife Love in the
Time of the Taliban, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Dec. 28, 1996, at 16.
130 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 58-59.
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controlling the marriage of a woman 31 often led to the guardian
taking ownership of her dower. Also, the husband could often
control his wife's dower because of her economic dependence on
him. These two social forces limited women's property rights in all
three example communities: Egypt, Israel, and the West Bank area.
3.2.1. Egypt
Smock and Youssef found that the dower often came to be
owned by the wife's patrilineal family.132 This was usually caused
by the family's control over whom the daughter married.133 This
study also found that a woman would forego a portion of her
dower that would be payable upon divorce in order to free herself
from a bad marriage. 134 Layish's study of Muslim women living in
Israel support these findings.
3.2.2. Israel
Layish found that it was fairly common in Israel's Muslim
communities for a wife's family to take ownership of her dower
property. "[A] woman was generally given in marriage by a
marriage guardian, who might be her father or brother or another
relative, and who received the dower on her behalf."135 Shari'a
court cases involving matrimonial disputes, often revealed that the
131 See id.
132 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 47.
133 See id. True stories of Muslim women reveal that a woman's father can
exert strong control over her marriage. Not surprisingly, the father often gets
control of the dower. In 1996, a 21-year old Pakistani woman named Saima
Waheed married the man of her choice. Her father objected because he did not
choose the husband. Consequently, he petitioned the Pakistan Lahore High Court
to annul the marriage. See Saeed Shah, Pakistani Woman Fights to Keep Husband,
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, May 20, 1996. Saima received so much pressure at home
to annul the marriage that she fled to a shelter for women. Her father then filed a
petition of habeas corpus for her removal from the shelter. See id. The father
argued that "a woman may not marry without her father's consent .... ." Saima
stated, "'[w]hat I have seen done to the women in my family, I did not want to
happen to me.... I'm afraid for my life... I have been threatened by my family
continuously since I ran away."' Id.
Iran offers another example of the control a father can exert over his daughter's
marriage. "In 1995, an 18-year-old Iranian girl was blinded, on a court's orders, for
marrying without her father's consent." Mary Bryant, Danger of Tunnel Vision from
Behind the Veil, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Jan. 18,1997, at 2.
134 See Bryant, supra note 133.
135 LAYIsH, supra note 38, at 48.
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dower! had been given to the woman's family and not to her.136
Layish also found "express evidence of husbands taking control of
their wives' dower without their consent." 137 Thus, in the Muslim
communities of Israel, the custom of guardianship and a husband's
power limited women's legal/Quranic right to dower.
3.2.3. West Bank
Moors' study of the West Bank Muslim community found the
clearest evidence of the dower right being limited by social and
customary forces. First, Moors, like Smock/Youssef and Layish,
found that a wife's father often kept part of the dower.138 Second,
Moors found that the stronger force behind the decline of dower
property was the societal shift from extended family networks to a
more nuclear family. 139 These social factors, combined with a more
industrialized economy, made women more economically
dependent on their husbands.140 This new marital dependence
made women more willing to relinquish dower.
For example, the women would generally not sue for their
dower unless their husband left them with no economic support at
all.141 Even though the wives did not receive their legal right to
dower, they would not sue a husband who was generally
maintaining her because that maintenance was too economically
important to put at risk.142 When the women did sue for their
dower, it was, in virtually all these claims, combined with a suit for
marital maintenance.143 The women would then drop the dower
claim once the husband agreed to the maintenance claim.'"
Thus, these women gave up their dower rights to strengthen
136 See id. at 49. "In several cases, a woman alleged that she had not received
the whole or part of the dower, and afterward it appeared that her father had
received it without her knowledge." Id.
137 Id
138 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 102.
139 See id. at 125 (noting that women's economic power is declining because
men are taking over wage labor positions previously held by women).
Additionally, a decrease in dowers and a new emphasis on marital relations have
made women increasingly dependent upon their husbands. See id.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 102.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id. (noting that the main intent of these cases was to obtain the crucial
marital maintenance).
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their position in their marriages, particularly to protect their
maintenance. Moors also found that women would relinquish
their dower rights at divorce. 45 Dower usually is given in two
forms, prompt dower and deferred dower.146 Prompt dower is due
at marriage, and deferred dower usually becomes due at divorce or
the death of the husband 47 Although the desire to strengthen the
marriage leads to women relinquishing the prompt dower, other
social forces lead to relinquishing the deferred dower.
Many widows refrain from claiming their dower at the death of
their husbands so that their sons might inherit more. 148 This is
probably to strengthen the son's obligation to maintain his mother;
the same reason women relinquish their inheritance share
generally. Also, women eager to get out of a bad marriage and
faced with limited legal divorce options often go through the khul
divorce.149 This divorce is easier; it requires no litigation and the
husband will be more willing to let the wife go because he receives
monetary consideration for the loss of his wife.' 50  This
consideration usually consists of the wife's renunciation of her
deferred dower.' 5' Finally, even if the husband initiates the
divorce, a woman often does not get her deferred dower because
she must go through time-consuming and often costly litigation to
get it.152 Thus, social forces also limit women's access to deferred
dower. Therefore, the lives of women on the West Bank exemplify
how social forces can limit women's real access to their legal right
to dower.
3.2.4. Positive Findings
The studies of dower are not universally disheartening. In
particular, Layish found that some Muslim women living in Israel
proper did receive their legal dower entitlement. Despite the
various social limitations in this community, Layish found much
evidence that some women received full ownership of their
145 See id. at 147.
146 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 45-46.
147 See id. at 46.
148 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 147.
149 See id. at 142.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See id.
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dower.15 3 Widows and spinsters who did not have a guardian
controlling their marriages (and thereby receiving the dower) got
their dowers15 4 Also, Layish found many cases where urban
women would sue in court or leave their husband's home to get
their- dower; though this was much less common for rural
women.155 Finally, Layish noted that when the women did sue for
their dowers the Shari'a courts decided in favor of the woman in
most cases.156 Therefore, overall, dower is limited by some social
forces, but this limitation does not undermine the legal right as
extensively as the social limitations on inheritance.
3.3. Marriage and Work
As noted previously, the obedience law of marriage severely
hinders a woman's ability to work outside of the home. Just as
social forces limited the legal rights of inheritance and dower,
social forces worsen the already extensive limitations on women's
ability to work. The connection between women's status in society
and their perceived chastity is the main social norm that limits
their employment options.
3.3.1. Egypt
Smock and Youssef offer the strongest evidence of how status
and chastity norms function in Muslim society. Their study
pointed to two major social forces that oppress women
economically: kinship ties' 57 and the power of honor.158 This
honor, and the social status that comes with honor is largely based
on a woman's chaste behavior. 5 9 Thus, "any suspicion or mistrust
of [the woman's] moral conduct can stigmatize her and her family
for ife." 16° For women, "[aictivities involving the public are...
153 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 49.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 49-50.
156 See id. at 60 (noting that these courts resisted customary practices that took
control of the dower out of women's hands).
157 The power of kinship ties to limit women economically was discussed in
the section on inheritance. See supra Section 3.1.
158 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 43.
159 See id. The honor of men is based on the chastity of their female family
members. See id. Women's honor and status is based on their own perceived
chastity. See id. at 44; see also Bryant, supra note 133, at 2 (noting that male honor
rests on female behavior).
160 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 44. Women often face physical
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easily linked with suspicions of promiscuous behavior . *-"161
Therefore, a woman's status in society is put at risk by her
employment, which places her in continuous contact with public
life.162
This loss of status by working can, for women, have very
harmful effects. For example, a woman who works or has worked
has a much harder time marrying (a crucial way to find economic
support in Muslim society).' 63 Thus, Smock and Youssef found
that women's status was based on how much they met the societal
expectations of chaste, reclusive behavior. 64 They found that the
status costs of working outweigh the benefits. This balance of
utilities causes the low percentage of female workers in Muslim
communities.165 Therefore, the social force for chaste behavior
further limits women's ability to gain economic resources through
work.
3.3.2. Israel
Layish did not extensively study the social forces acting on
Muslim women's ability to work. 166 However, she did cite one
study of Muslim communities in Israel that found the severe
restrictions of traditional society limited women's ability to
work.167
3.3.3. West Bank
Moors' study supports Smock and Youssef's findings. Moors
found that in Muslim communities, working women are very
controversial, particularly if they leave the West Bank and go into
injury for "unchaste" behavior. This violence is sometimes sanctioned by Islamic
law. For example, the Jordanian Penal Code exempts a man from any penalty if
he wounds or even kills his wife or daughter because they committed adultery.
See Nicholas Kochin, Bound by Faith and Statute, FIN. TIMES, July 20,1996, at 13.
161 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 45.
162 See id,
163 See id, at 44.
164 See id, at 48.
165 See id. at 49 ("The conspicuous absence of married women from the
occupational world ... could very well be caused, in part, by [women's] own
assessment of the gains and losses involved.").
166 She did find some evidence that it was easier for Muslim women to work
in more modernized urban areas. See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 7.
167 See id. (citing A. COHEN, ARAB BORDER VILLAGES IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1965)).
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Israel to work.168 The social norm viewed working women as
putting themselves in great "moral danger."169 Thus, as was the
case in Israel, a working woman risked her status as a chaste
female by going out to work.170
Moors did find that some women worked outside of the home.
These women, however, do not undermine the basic premise that
most women do not work because of social stigma. These women
only worked because of dire financial need. The economic
situation was so bad that it outweighed even the strict social
punishments for working. 71 The behavior is in accord with the
view of many Islamic jurists, who hold that women may work only
in cases of necessity.' 72
Even for these working women, earned income did not always
bring economic power. Fathers often prevented their working
daughters from marrying because the family depended on her
wages. 7 3 Also, widows were known to give a portion of their
wages to their sons.174 Overall, women in the West Bank did not
work because working brought suspicions of promiscuity. The
only exceptions were very poor women in dire financial need.
Therefore, this community, as well as the Egyptian community,
reveals how social norms worsen the already extensive limitations
on women's employment.
3.4. Social Forces in Afghanistan
Studies of Muslim communities show that social forces limit
women's legal rights to inheritance and dower, and can effectively
prevent their employment. The Taliban government has forcibly
imposed these social norms on the part of Afghanistan they
control.175 The Taliban originate from the historically rural and
168 See MooRs, supra note 45, at 182.
169 Id. at 184. This moralistic view of working women "ties in with the
cultural emphasis on the need to curtail women's freedom of movement to avoid
[sexual] relations, which were seen as undermining the social order." Id.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 185, 186.
172 See Khaliq, supra note 21, at 25-26.
173 See MooRs, supra note 45, at 188.
174 See id.
175 See, e.g., Christopher Thomas, Militants Bring a Veil Down on Battered Kabul,
TIMES (London), Sept. 30, 1996, at 11 (noting that women were beaten by the
militia for wearing "un-Islamic" dress and have been banned from working); John
F. Bums, New Afghan Rulers Impose Harsh Mores of the Islamic Code, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
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conservative Kandahar area' 76 from which they bring the
patriarchal culture which is the main culprit in suppressing
Muslim women's economic opportunities. 77
Specifically, in accordance with the government's promise to
impose Islamic law,178 the Taliban will incorporate the traditional
familial maintenance provisions of the Shari'a. Thus, Taliban
Afghan society will possess the factor that has been found to limit
women's real control over inheritance.179 The Taliban government
is also, as part of imposing the Sharf'a, likely to incorporate both
marriage guardianship and the provisions giving husbands. broad
divorce and maintenance power. The region will therefore possess
the factors that limit women's real access to dower.180
Finally, the Taliban government has made its disapproval of
working women very clear. One of its first acts was to ban women
from all employment.181 In Afghanistan, the customary and social
norms that limit women's employment opportunities have the
extra force of the government's coercive power.182 Thus, the
Taliban state possesses these social and customary forces that will
severely limit the economic prospects of Afghan women.
1, 1996, at Al (same).
The Taliban have established a religious police, the Office for the Propagation of
Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice, who were involved in the stoning to death of a
couple who had committed adultery. See John F. Burns, Stoning of Afghan Adulterers,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,1996, at 18.
176 See Burns, supra note 8, at A10.
177 The Taliban have closed all of the schools for girls while leaving the
schools for boys open. See 60 Minutes: Taliban, supra note 7. The Taliban's Deputy
Foreign Minister, when asked what women should do instead of working,
replied, "sewing and knitting." Id. He went on to comment, "[tlhey should be
sitting in their home[s]." Id.
Sima Wali of the Afghan Women's Network stated, "[tlhis is the darkest
moment in Afghan history for women and girls. The Taliban version of Islam is
male-defined [and] extremist." CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Oct.
10,1996).
178 The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Taliban government, Sher
Mohammed Stanakzai, has stated, "Afghanistan is an Islamic state, and our rules
and regulations will be... Islamic rules. Whatever is in Islam... will be
implemented [by the Taliban]. We will be strict with that." 60 Minutes: Taliban,
supra note 7.
179 See supra Section 3.1.
180 See supra Section 3.2.
181 See CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 10, 1996).
182 See supra Section 3.4.
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4. A METHODOLOGY FOR REFORM
The new Taliban rule presents a bleak economic future for
Afghan women. To improve this situation, however, women's
rights advocates must go beyond the typical method of blaming
Islam itself.183 The Taliban's main philosophy is Islamic rule. 84
This philosophy was also the unifying force in the rebellion against
the Soviets. 185 Therefore, to be successful, any reform must come
from within the bounds of Islam. "[R]eforms must be rooted in a
consistent Islamic rationale."186 The best prospects for reform stem
from the fact that Islam does possess a methodology for change
that can improve the economic situation of women.
4.1. Ijtihad: Islamic Methodologyfor Reform
The early development of Islamic jurisprudence was at first
liberal, allowing for growth and change. Until about the tenth
century the doctrine of ijtihad, or individual reasoning, was
accepted.187 This doctrine allows an individual to make his or her
own interpretation of Islamic doctrine. 88 If this interpretation
becomes accepted by other jurists, it can become valid law.189 Two
forces, however, closed this dynamic force of ijtihad.
First, customary practice of Arabia erroneously became
equated with the practice of the Prophet and was thereby given an
unwarranted sacrosanct character. 190  Second, the doctrine of
taqlid, or imitation of early Muslim communities, was developed.
In the tenth century it was decided that Islam was fully developed
and no further change was necessary. Islam was no longer open to
interpretation and the early customs were meant for imitation. The
doctrine of ijtihad was rejected in favor of taqlid; "[t]he doors of
ijtihad were closed." 191 The job of the Muslim jurist was now
limited to finding how Muslim society was structured in ancient
183 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11, at 312.
184 See 60 Minutes: Taliban, supra note 7.
185 See John-Thor Dahlburg, Cold War Incursion Sowed Seeds of Terror, L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 4,1996, at Al.
186 EsPosrro, supra note 21, at 102.
187 See id. at 103-104.
188 See id. at 103.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 Id. at 104.
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times.192 This began an "era of sterility" in Islam that continues to
the present day. 9 3 Muslim reformers as early as the twelfth
century argued against the taqlid and in favor of reviving the
ijtihad.194
Modem Muslim feminists embrace this idea of reviving ijtihad
as a methodology of reform. 195 First, they note that the Prophet's
original message was very liberating for women.% In particular,
Mohammed specifically changed some of the worst anti-woman
practices of the very patriarchal tribal society. 197 For example, he
ended the practice of selling wives with his dower rules, imposed
the rule of women's consent to marriage, and made significant
strides in ending the very entrenched practice of polygamy.'9 8
Mohammed even "designated his wife A'isha a religious
authority[,] stating, 'take half of your religion from this ruddy-
complexioned woman.""99
Second, Muslim feminists argue that Mohammed not only
provided as much change for women as the times would allow, but
also left the seeds for further change. 20° Thus, they embrace the
revival of a new interpretation, ijtihad, a message that should be
heard by those who desire reform in Afghanistan. As stated by
Leila Sayeh and Adriaen Morse in their argument for a ijtihad
reform methodology:
[w]omen have fundamental freedoms within Islam, and all
the goals of equality espoused by the West can be achieved
192 See id.
193 See id. (quoting SUBHI MAHMASANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI Fl AL-ISLAM 39
(Farhat J. Ziadeh trans., E.J. Brill 1961)).
194 See id.
195 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11. Zuleikha Abu Risha, a founding
member of the Islamic Women's Society, has stated that, "'it is also time that
educated women read the Koran for themselves and make their own interpreta-
tions of it.'" Pamela Goldberg, Seeing Through Women's Eyes, 11 N.YL. SCH. J.
HUM. Rm. 603, 612 (1994) (citation omitted).
196 Jan Goodwin, in her book PRICE OF HONOR: MUSLIM WOMEN LIFT THE VEIL
OF SILENCE ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD, argues that "Islam... is, at root, protective of
women's rights and inherently pro-woman." Goldberg, supra note 199, at 612.
197 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11, at 324-30:
198 See id.
199 Id. at 322.
200 Sayeh and Morse describe this as the methodology of "gradualism,"
which they argue is inherent in Islam. See id. at 320-21.
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by applying the notion of gradualism inherent in the
religion. Thus, the best way to solve this problem may not
lie in dictating from the outside what standards must be
met by the culture, but rather in encouraging a
liberalization of the interpretation of the religion by Islamic
scholars themselves.201
4.2. Prospects for Reform in Afghanistan
The seeds for reform do exist in Afghanistan. Women were
somewhat free under the previous rule, with many of them
becoming teachers, nurses, and doctors. 202 Afghan women do not
accept the Taliban without criticism. In the Afghan city of Herat,
women publicly protested the Taliban's severe measures. 203 As
one Afghan woman stated, "I have taken up this struggle [to fight
the extremists] not just because I am a woman, but because this is
an injustice in the name of my religion. And this misuse of Islam is
a major factor in making my religion completely misunderstood by
the West ... 204 Thus, Muslim Afghan women use their own
interpretation of Islam to argue against and criticize the policies of
the Taliban.205
In addition, Afghanistan's influential neighbor, Pakistan,206 has
itself embraced the ideology of reform for women.207 In particular,
201 Id. at 331-32.
202 See 60 Minutes: Taliban, supra note 7.
203 See 20 Women Arrested in Taliban-held Afghan City, AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Dec. 24, 1996; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Former President Praises Anti-
Taleban Demonstrations in Herat, (BBC radio broadcast, Jan. 4,1997).
204 Goldberg, supra note 195, at 620 (citation omitted).
205 See id. When Afghan women also protested the Taliban's policies in
Mazar-i-Sharif, one demonstrator stated that "Taleban views on women have no
authority in the Koran." Michael Dynes, Women Use Make-up in Fight Against
Taleban Code, TIMES (London), Oct. 24,1996.
206 Pakistan is more than just a neighbor to the Taliban. It supported this
faction financially during the Afghan conflict, see Dahlburg, supra note 188, at Al,
and was one of the first countries to welcome their rule, see Bhutto Hopes Taliban
Will Safeguard Women's Rights, AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 4, 1996. See also BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts: Pakistan Gives Cash, Machinery For Central Asia Road
Link (BBC radio broadcast, Dec. 20, 1996) (noting that Pakistan is giving
Afghanistan money to rebuild some of its roads). Thus, Pakistan might be able to
exert influence on the Taliban.
207 See generally EsPosrro, supra note 21, at 72-91 (detailing the history of
reform in Pakistan).
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Pakistani courts have successfully revived the ijtihad.2 8 Thus,
Pakistan's courts do not feel constrained by the doctrine of taqlid
which limits the ability to change the status of women. Pakistani
courts exercise ijtihad to meet social needs.2 9 Thus, the best
prospects for reform of the Taliban come from Pakistan's possible
influence 210 and the hope of the further revival of ijtihad in Islam.
5. CONCLUSION
This Comment establishes that social forces, and not Islamic
law, are the main factors that will cause the economic oppression
of Afghan women. Section 1 shows that the economic position of
Afghan women is of more than academic concern; it is relevant to
many international issues. Section 2 establishes the first tenet of
the argument: Islamic law does not, overall, dictate a subordinate
economic position for women. Rather, the technical Islamic laws
on inheritance and dower give women rights to economic
resources. Section 3, by analyzing studies of other Muslim
communities, establishes the second tenet of the argument: social
forces are the real culprits behind the economic oppression of
Muslim women, and Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, will possess
these limiting social forces. Thus, it is possible to predict that the
cultural norms in Afghanistan will be the real cause of Afghan
women's subordinate economic position. Finally, Section 4 shows
that any improvement in the economic position of women in
Afghanistan must come from a reinterpretation of Islamic law and
not a rejection of Islam itself.
20s See id. at 98-99. Pakistan has instituted a number of reforms for women,
such as restricting child marriage. Women also have greater freedom to divorce
because of laws allowing divorce for non-payment of maintenance and laws
making dower rights more enforceable. See id. at 72-91.
209 See id. at 99.
210 See id.
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